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RESEARCH ARTICLE
The Responsible Consumer in the Digital Age: 
On the Conceptual Shift from ‘Average’ to 
‘Responsible’ Consumer and the Inadequacy of 
the ‘Information Paradigm’ in Consumer Financial 
Protection
Cătălin Gabriel Stănescu*
The article1 argues that the ‘information paradigm’, within which the concept of ‘average’ 
consumer operates, is unfit to provide adequate financial protection to consumers in the 
aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis and in the wake of the digital age. As the complexity of 
financial and digital financial services increases, consumers are expected to educate themselves 
and become financially literate, while traders’ liability and state intervention are reduced to a 
minimum.  ‘Average’ consumers are turned into ‘responsible’ ones.
Using as examples the Mortgage Directive and European Securities and Markets Authority 
(ESMA)’s position on Initial Coin Offerings (ICOs), the article shows that the former ‘paternalistic’ 
attitude towards consumer protection in both EU legislation and policy making was replaced 
with a ‘self-help’ approach and contests the general wisdom regarding consumers’ ability to 
participate in financial markets or understand the risks posed by novel products and services 
facilitated by technical innovation and digitization. 
The article calls for a reconsideration of the information paradigm and for a pro-active 
approach of the EU regulatory bodies to provide consumers with efficient protection. 
Keywords: Consumer protection; Digitization; Information paradigm; Average consumer; 
Responsible consumer
1 Introduction: A Consumer Issue of Significant Proportions
In the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis, three strands in the related research and policy discussions 
could be discerned. One focused on understanding the causes and the path that led to the crisis. The second 
focused on prevention and methods to preclude such a crisis from reoccurring. The third focused on mecha-
nisms to deal with the effects of the crisis and offer relief to parties involved. However, the solutions mainly 
addressed the financial sector and the restoration of stability and solvency of banks, without appropriate 
tools for aiding consumer debtors in distress.
By 2009, around one hundred legal proposals were already generated by the financial crisis.2 More than 
forty financial reform measures were implemented by the European Commission.3 However, not only that 
the situation of consumer debtors in distress was not addressed, but the proposed insolvency regimes for 
banks and companies showed extensive bias in their favor. Instead of risk sharing and stronger regulation of 
 * Post-doctoral researcher, Centre for Enterprise Liability, Faculty of Law, University of Copenhagen, Copenhagen, Denmark, 
 catalin-gabriel.stanescu@jur.ku.dk
 1 The article was presented at the International Conference “The Responsible Consumer in the Digital Age. International and Nordic 
Perspectives on Financial Consumer Protection”, organized in 2018 by the Centre for Enterprise Liability, Faculty of Law, University of 
Copenhagen, with the support of the Carlsberg Foundation, the Dreyers Fond and the Romanian Embassy to the Kingdom of Denmark 
and Iceland. The author would like to thank for feed-back to all participants, the reviewers and for comments on the early versions of 
the article to Prof. Tibor Tajti, Dr. Liviu Damsa and Dr. Asress Adimi Gikay. Any potential errors, however, belong to the author. 
 2 PR Wood, ‘Legal impact of the financial crisis: a brief list’ 4 Capital Markets Law Journal 436, 436. 
 3 L Kastner, Civil society and financial regulation consumer finance protection and taxation after the financial crisis (Routledge, 
 Abingdon, Oxon New York, NY 2018) 77.
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financial products, the measures adopted focused on more disclosure, transparency, financial education and 
assessment of consumer creditworthiness in order to make financial services more sustainable.4 However, as 
the article shows, these measures were generally not backed by sanctions, thus leaving prospective borrow-
ers at the whim of the financial institutions. In addition, legislators and supervisory bodies are still unable 
to keep up with products of financial innovation, such as ICOs.
1.1 The Article’s Aim
The article argues that while regulators and enforcers expect consumers to protect themselves with the data 
provided by disclosure requirements, consumers are still vulnerable to the craftiness of professionals offer-
ing financial services despite obvious risks posed. Things are even more complicated today when financial 
and technical innovation flood the market with complex products whose effects not even professionals are 
able to fully predict or understand. 
Nevertheless, the current legal framework is more lenient on financial institutions and places the hard-
est burdens on consumers – burden of proof, burden of understanding and comparing characteristics of 
complex financial products and bearing the entirety of the negative consequences that might derive from 
the deals they entered into – disregarding their weaker status, and without questioning their capacity to 
comprehend the information. 
The article claims that the increasing emphasis on mandatory disclosure increases the responsibility of 
consumers, not their protection. As apparent from practice, if the disclosed information proves accurate, the 
consumer is deemed responsible for his own acts.5 In addition, in cases where self-protection is not possible 
due to the complexity of the financial product, the weaker position of the ‘average’ consumer is blamed on 
his lack of financial education (translating also into a lack of information).6 The remedy offered is education 
itself. Thus, there is more to this phenomenon than ‘a shift of responsibility risk’7 as identified by Micklitz, 
Stuyck and Terrin. It is a shift of concepts. 
The ‘average’ consumer shifts into a ‘responsible’ consumer. Consumers are now expected to help them-
selves by pursuing financial education, raising their knowledge and awareness levels, seeking advice, keep-
ing updated with technological or financial innovations and making rational decisions, even though the 
complexity of the products and services offered is only increasing. This position of the EU policy makers and 
judiciary raises the question whether consumer protection did not turn into a self-help mechanism for most 
of the consumers, from vulnerable groups upwards. How informed should consumers be in the digital age? 
How informed can they be? The article answers these questions and proves that the classic information para-
digm, the average consumer benchmark and the policies focusing on financial education are insufficient to 
protect consumers, unless coupled with regulation of financial products.
1.2 The Information Paradigm
At its core, the EU aims to achieve a high level of consumer protection8 and to increase the smooth function-
ing of the internal market.9 These two aims are at times incompatible, which is reflected in the policy choices 
of Member States. For instance, in the UK, the consumer policy is aimed at ‘making competition more 
 4 A notable exception is the Dodd-Franck Act in the US. However, in the EU, none of the measures implemented matched the Ameri-
can initiative, despite the existence of a proposal to set-up a pan-EU Consumer Protection Agency alongside with new supervisory 
authorities or arguments in favor of the creation of a European Financial Users Authority, to act as a consumer regulator and 
protect consumers of financial services. Explanations can be found in the influence of financial sector groups and their lobbying 
efforts at preventing regulation. Ibid. 77, 90, 92.
 5 H-W Micklitz, J Stuyck and E Terryn Cases, Materials and Text on Consumer Law (1st edn Hart Publishing, North America 2010), 
373. The increase in consumer responsibility in regard to financial products was noticed both in the US and Australia. For US, see 
JY Campbell and others, ‘Consumer Financial Protection’ 25 The Journal of Economic Perspectives 91, 2. ‘Consumer finance has 
increasingly become a ‘do-it-yourself’ activity. Households are expected to make decisions about pension plan contributions and 
payouts, to choose from a wide array of credit instruments to fund everything from home purchase to short-term cash needs, and 
more generally to assume a greater level of responsibility for their financial well-being.’ For Australia, see R Sandlant, ‘CONSUMER 
FINANCIAL PROTECTION: FUTURE DIRECTIONS’ Jassa-The Finsia Journal Of Applied Finance 42, 42, noticing that ‘financial ser-
vices grow in complexity faster than the capacity of regulators (let alone consumers) to stay ‘one step ahead’‘ and that consumers 
are ‘increasingly being given more, not less, responsibility for their own long-term financial security’. 
 6 Campbell and others, 4.
 7 Micklitz, Stuyck and Terryn, 373.
 8 See the corroborated provisions of Art 114, Para 3 of TFEU (‘The Commission […] concerning […] consumer protection, will take as 
a base a high level of protection, taking account in particular of any new development based on scientific facts’) with those of Art 
169, Para 1 of TFEU (‘In order to promote the interests of consumers and to ensure a high level of consumer protection, the Union 
shall contribute to protecting the […] economic interests of consumers, as well as to promoting their right to information, educa-
tion and to organize themselves in order to safeguard their interests’) (emphasis added).
 9 BB Duivenvoorde, Consumer Benchmarks in the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive (Springer International Publishing, 2015), 30.
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effective’, which means ‘the rationale for consumer protection becomes in part the health of the economy, 
rather than merely the protection of the consumer’.10 This policy orientation influenced and inspired by the 
assertiveness of US consumers, is deemed an appropriate model in the UK.11 One should notice, however, 
that consumer protection by consumer action and assertiveness, means that the authorities recognize their 
limitations in ensuring adequate protection and not only empower, but also incentivize consumers to take 
action into their own hands. The incentivizing factor is unfortunately lacking in the EU.
Instead of incentives for action and empowerment of consumers, the EU deems it enough to provide 
mandatory information. The underlying idea behind what is known as the information paradigm, is that if 
consumers are provided with sufficient and adequate disclosure, then they will be capable to protect them-
selves, with minimum intervention from state authorities on the market.12 
Under the information paradigm, the consumer is expected to be ‘reasonably well-informed’, ‘reasonably 
observant’, and ‘circumspect’ about the information he receives and thus able to protect himself from 
wrong decisions. Each of the three characteristics has its own implications: being informed relates to the 
level of knowledge the consumer is assumed to have, being observant refers to the intensity and absorp-
tion of information, while being circumspect tackles the degree of critical attitude the consumer should 
have when processing information. These are the traits of a concept in abstracto, that of an ‘average’ 
consumer.  
1.3 The Limits of the Information Paradigm
In concreto, however, the ‘average consumer’ standard ignores the bulk of consumer behavior studies reveal-
ing that people often make mistakes, in a predictable manner, and do not always engage in a conscious deci-
sion-making process by weighing advantages and disadvantages.13 The lack of overlap between the abstract 
and the concrete concepts should be worrying when it comes to financial services, given their catastrophic 
consequences in the life of consumers.14
The solution of protecting consumers solely by providing (standardized) information is inadequate for 
two main reasons. Firstly, not all consumers deemed ‘average’ are able to properly understand the informa-
tion given and to protect themselves. The fact that a consumer meets the requirements of being reasonably 
circumspect does not mean that he fully understands the information or that he is able to make the right 
decision, especially when he needs to choose between the product and no product, or when the information 
relied upon is manipulated by the provider.15 This raises the question of how adequate is the application of 
the average consumer standard in consumer financial protection.
Secondly, the complexity of financial products and the uncertainty of their usage has many times eluded 
even professionals, as seen in the case of subprime mortgages that caused the 2008 financial crisis. There, 
both corporate greed and consumer over-confidence led to a financial crash. However, although the guilt 
was shared, the risks were left entirely on the consumers. One would have expected that in the aftermath a 
reallocation of risks will occur, but that was not the case, especially in the EU where the focus is on financial 
literacy and advice. Beside the issue of fairness, this raises the question whether financial education can be 
the panacea envisioned by the EU institutions, or whether information and education should be coupled 
with financial product regulation and sharing risks,16 in case of business misconduct, to avoid unfair distri-
butional outcomes.
 10 G Howells, ‘The Potential and Limits of Consumer Empowerment by Information’ (Oxford, UK) 32 Journal of Law and Society 349, 
350.
 11 Ibid.
 12 Micklitz, Stuyck and Terryn, 372.
 13 A-F Lefevre and M Chapman, ‘Behavioural economics and financial consumer protection’, 15–25.
 14 A survey conducted by the FSA, under the title Financial Capability in the UK: Delivering Change, dated March 2006, shows that 
these issues were already visible prior to the financial crisis, <http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/other/fincap_delivering.pdf>, accessed 
26 October 2018. However, there is no substantial evidence that the measures recommended and implemented, such as: personal 
financial education in schools, better, more targeted financial communication with consumers, availability of financial advice 
helped defer the crisis or alleviate its effects. See: Micklitz, Stuyck and Terryn  375. Campbell and others, 3.
 15 An unpublished survey organized by the Danish Competition and Consumer Authority, presented at the Responsible Consumer 
in the Digital Age Conference, organized at the University of Copenhagen in 2018, showed that consumers rarely read or compare 
the mandatory disclosures offered by the banks in the case of mortgage loans. Moreover, the behavioral study used cameras that 
followed the eyes of the subjects and was able to determine the reading habits of consumers, concluding that it is possible for 
relevant information to be ‘hidden’ in plain sight. 
 16 Campbell and others, 3,  Sandlant, 45.
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1.4 Structure and Methodology
The article is structured in two main sections. The first analyzes the fitness of the average consumer bench-
mark and finds it unsuitable for the purpose of consumer financial protection. The second argues that by 
placing more burden on the consumer, the ‘average’ consumer became a ‘responsible’ one and that the self-
help approach behind the ‘responsible’ consumer not only exposes him to significant risk but deprives him 
of protection.
In terms of methodology the article employs black letter and case law analyses, as well as, examples and 
anecdotal evidence. The article uses the Mortgage Directive and the example of Initial Coin Offerings (ICOs) 
to prove the inadequacy of the information paradigm in consumer financial protection. The discussion on 
the Mortgage Directive’s emphasis on financial education and responsible lending shows that although the 
responsibility for a mortgage loan is shared, it is not joint. In case of default, the risk of non-payment lies 
solely with the consumer, even if the bank granted the credit after conducting a wrong assessment or by 
choosing to ignore it. 
The example of ICOs proves, on the one hand, that the usage of technical slang (tokens, distributed ledger 
or blockchain) is not comprehensible, and many consumers – whether financially literate or not – would 
have problems understanding it, even if the information provided would be entirely accurate. On the other 
hand, the lack of regulatory response to the risks posed by ICOs emphasizes the inadequacy of the mini-
malist attitude adopted by the supervisory body at Union level in ensuring adequate consumer financial 
protection.
The article concludes with recommendations for restoring the high level of consumer protection that was 
promised in the Treaty.  
2 Unfit for Purpose: The Average Consumer
To discuss consumer financial protection and the details of such protection, one must first establish who is 
worthy of protection and how to determine the benchmark. That is because once provided with the regu-
lated tools – minimum disclosure of relevant information regarding the risks involved by accessing the 
product or service – consumers may find themselves above the threshold that would entitle them to the 
additional protection granted to vulnerable categories. 
Legislators expect consumers not only to read and take notice of the disclosures, but also to understand 
and observe them, or suffer the consequences.  Consumers should be capable of comprehending both the 
information received, and the risks involved and withstand the potential ‘temptation’ of financial products 
or services that can have detrimental effects to their well-being. If there are no obstacles – either physical, or 
intellectual – to their understanding, consumers are expected to be reasonably observant and circumspect. 
A certain level of credulity or naivety would not allow them to escape the consequences of the contracts 
they enter, unless the terms were unfair or failed to observe the validity conditions. The recent CJEU case law 
regarding consumer credit contracts granted in Swiss francs provides a very clear evidence of the matter.17 
2.1 A Procrustean Size: The Average Consumer
The current perception on consumers and the effects of the information paradigm were not established 
from the outset. They are the result of a continuous change.18 However, as complexity of financial products 
increases together with the expansion of e-commerce, technical innovation, or digitization, the lowering 
standards are not fit to offer the adequate protection promised.  
At the beginning of consumer legislation, the consumer was perceived as the ‘weaker party’,19 in need 
of protection. This weakness stemmed from the lower bargaining and financial power as well as from an 
asymmetry of information vis-a-vis the professionals providing services and products.20 Nevertheless, by 
1998, the consumer case law of the CJEU, prior to the implementation of the Directive addressing unfair 
 17 Case C-186/16, Ruxandra Paula Andriciuc and Others v. Banca Romaneasca SA, Judgement of 20 September 2017 and Case C-51/17, 
OTP Bank Nyrt., OTP Facktoring Koveteleskezelo Zrt v. Terez Ilyes and Emil Kiss, Decision 20 September 2018.
 18 The evolution happened in stages which can were identified either chronologically, or by concepts employed by the legislators. See 
Hans Micklitz, The Consumer: Marketised, Fragmentised, Constitutionalised in D Leczykiewicz, The Images of the Consumer in EU Law, 
Legislation, Free Movement and Competition Law (1. ed. edn Bloomsbury Publishing PLC, London 2016), 29.
 19 Ibid. 17.
 20 Case C-484/08 Caja de Ahorros y Monte de Piedad de Madrid v Asociación de Usuarios de Servicios Bancarios (Ausbanc) [2010], Para 
27.
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business-to-consumer commercial practices (UCPD),21 had already reached a level where the expecta-
tions placed on the consumer were relatively high. The reason was that the trend, which enabled Member 
States to provide enhanced consumer protection, shifted towards fostering the internal market and avoid-
ing having traders blocked or affected by either consumers’ claims or national paternalistic and interven-
tionist approaches from state agencies entrusted with consumer welfare.22 As David Byrne, the European 
Commissioner for Health and Consumer Protection observed in 2003, ‘the perception of the place and role 
of the consumer has changed. He is no longer just a person to be protected. He is also a major actor on the 
market’, who must ‘play [his] part to maximize the smooth functioning of the market.23
In the Gut Springenheide case,24 the CJEU established the concept of an ‘average consumer’ by reference 
to a triad of factors. The consumer was expected to be ‘reasonably well-informed’, ‘reasonably observant’, and 
‘circumspect’. Each of the three characteristics has its own implications: being informed relates to the level 
of knowledge the consumer is assumed to have, being observant refers to the intensity and absorption of 
information, while being circumspect tackles the degree of critical attitude the consumer should have when 
processing information. 
The concept embraced by the CJEU reflects the concept homo economicus developed by classical eco-
nomics: ‘an ideal and perfect consumer, who knows what is best for him, acts thoughtfully and consist-
ently, weighs carefully all options available and makes the best decision to serve his interests’.25 Without 
adequately considering the background of the consumers and targeting a ‘one size fits all’ type of solution, 
the CJEU expects consumers to be careful and rational decision makers.26 In abstracto, there is no problem 
with the CJEU’s standpoint, as consumers should bear some of the burden of their own protection. However, 
in concreto, it ignores all the bulk of consumer behavior studies revealing that people often make mistakes, 
in a predictable manner, and do not always engage in a conscious decision-making process by weighing 
advantages and disadvantages.27 
What most of the studies have in common is pointing out that availability of information does not auto-
matically mean that consumers will perceive and comprehend information in an accurate manner.28 When 
it comes to the financial sector,29 considering the complexity of financial products and services as well as the 
multitude of choices there are simply too many additional influential factors in place that the concept of 
‘average consumer’ (as developed by the Court) fails to consider. These include information overload, cogni-
tive biases, decision making flaws, cultural and linguistic differences.30 Only recently did the CJEU realize 
that the language in which the information is provided must also be ‘intelligible’ both at ‘a formal and gram-
matical level’ and that ‘the particular expertise and knowledge of a financial product seller or supplier’ are 
circumstances that need to be taken into consideration when assessing the fairness of a financial contract.31
At the same time, CJEU’s case law reveals a tendency to prefer consumer’s access to information over 
general prohibitions of certain types of trade practices.32 In other words, a certain degree of trickery might 
be tolerated, as the average consumer is not expected to be misled easily.33 In the Court’s view an average 
consumer is not naïve and does not draw conclusions lightly on the basis of advertising slogans.34 On the 
 21 Directive 2005/29/EC concerning unfair business-to-consumer commercial practices in the internal market, <https://eur-lex.
europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32005L0029&from=EN>, accessed 27 October 2018.
 22 C Poncibo and R Incardona, ‘The Average Consumer, the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive, and the Cognitive Revolution’ 30 
Journal of Consumer Policy Issue 21, 36 and G Howells and T Wilhelmsson, ‘EC consumer law: has it come of age?’ 28 European 
Law Review 370, 370.
 23 David Byrne, ‘Principles of Consumer Protection in the European Union (Ministerial Meeting on Consumer Policy, Rome, 21 
November 2003, p. 2 <http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-03-561_en.pdf>, accessed 28 June 2018.
 24 C-210/96 Gut Springenheide and Tusky v Oberkreisdirektor des Kreises Steinfurt [1998], Para 31.
 25 Lefevre and Chapman, 4.
 26 Duivenvoorde, 166.
 27 Ibid. 166. For a summary of several consumer behavior studies and reports applicable to financial services, see Lefevre and Chap-
man, 15–25. The idea of one size fits all solutions was criticized also in the US. Campbell and others, 16.
 28 J Trzaskowski, ‘The Unfair Commercial Practices Directive and Vulnerable Consumers’ (‘14th Conference of the International Asso-
ciation of Consumer Law’ 2013) 3, <http://www.legalriskmanagement.com/PUBLICATIONS/2013_IACL.pdf> accessed 28 October 
2018.
 29 Duivenvoorde, p. 167. 
 30 Ibid. 167–169. See also Trzaskowski, p. 3, Lefevre and Chapman, 9, 12–14.
 31 Case C-186/16, Ruxandra Paula Andriciuc and Others v. Banca Romaneasca SA, Judgement of 20 September 2017. 
 32 Duivenvoorde, 97.
 33 Ibid. 89.
 34 Ibid. 102.
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contrary, it is a self-reliant consumer, who is able to process and act on proffered information, or face the 
consequences.35 A standard model of consumer behavior was created by the CJEU’s case law, based on the 
idea of a ‘rational’ man, free from the shackles of paternalism or state protectionism.36 Nevertheless, despite 
its name, the ‘average consumer’ is not at all average, but a super-consumer,37 as its traits are obviously supe-
rior to those of a real-life one, portrayed by behavioral economics or psychology.38
This concept was embraced by the legislators and became the main benchmark in the UCPD,39 although 
some claim the concept is implicitly used in other normative acts as well.40 The ‘average consumer’ became 
the cornerstone of consumer protection, as the UCPD sought full harmonization41 and had an over-encom-
passing scope, covering both pre- and post-sale practices and financial services.42 The general adoption of 
the concept of ‘average consumer’, however, equates with a decrease of the actual level of consumer pro-
tection. This is directly proportional with the emphasis being put on the trader to refrain from unfair acts, 
rather than the consumer’s ability to avoid being affected by the trader’s potentially unfairness.43 
The UCPD complemented the concept and added two alternative benchmarks that are supposed to pre-
vent exploitation of ‘vulnerable consumers’, by stating that commercial practices are banned only to the 
extent they would ‘materially distort the economic behavior of the average consumer’ and that ‘harm must 
be foreseeable to the trader’.44 The UCPD legislated the divide already apparent in CJEU’s case law, by distin-
guishing between consumers able to protect their own interest – average consumers – and those in need 
of special protection – the vulnerable consumers. The exclusive use of the information paradigm is limited 
only when vulnerable target groups are involved.45 
Notwithstanding its stated concern with vulnerable groups, the UCPD has failed to protect less well-
informed or less well-educated consumers,46 unless these latter proved that their lack of information or 
education was due to some form of impairment. At the same time, it failed to establish rules to differentiate 
between types of services and information, adopting a position according to which average consumers are 
presumed to be encyclopedias of general knowledge. This position assumes that average consumers would 
be able to collect, read and understand any information about any product, compare financial products, 
make proper assessments and predictions, despite ample evidence that this is not the case.47 The informa-
tion paradigm proves to be not only insufficient, but also unfit in the case of complex financial services, as it 
is today in the wake of digital financial products, where disclosure is a liability-management tool for product 
providers.48 
Summing up, the average consumer became the rule, while the vulnerable one the exception. The largest 
‘chunk’ of consumers has been excluded from protection, which was replaced with standard information 
about everything and then left to take care of its own interests. 
 35 Ibid. 98.
 36 M Dani, ‘Assembling the fractured European consumer’ 36 European Law Review 362, 6.
 37 Noticing the same issue, Trzaskowski speaks of ‘a kind of expert consumer’ while Poncibo and Incardona speak of a ‘Mr/Mrs. I Know 
It All’. See: Trzaskowski, 9 and Poncibo and Incardona, 36.
 38 Duivenvoorde, 177. See also: Dani, 6, Lefevre and Chapman, 4.
 39 Recital 30 of the UCPD.
 40 See for instance: E Theocharidi, ‘Effectiveness of the ADR directive: standard of average consumer and exceptions. (Alternative 
dispute resolution)’ 24 European Review of Private Law, 108–111. The author argues that in the absence of explicit provisions one 
cannot exclude the application of the average consumer concept. Among the reasons provided the author notes that even the 
jurisprudence of the Court of Justice has used the concept in other areas of consumer protection, such as unfair contract terms, 
although the Directive does not make any reference to the concept.
 41 Trzaskowski, 2, 4–5.
 42 However, the latter were excluded from the full harmonization effect. Duivenvoorde, 53. Also: Trzaskowski, 6. By allowing Member 
States to go beyond the full harmonization sought by the Directive, legislators seem to recognize both the importance and the 
impact of the financial products and services in the life of consumers as well as the potential non-suitability of the average con-
sumer benchmark.
 43 Duivenvoorde, 56.
 44 Trzaskowski, 26.
 45 Duivenvoorde, 95.
 46 Ibid. 60, 177.
 47 For details see: Poncibo and Incardona, 30–33, Howells, 359–360, Howells and Wilhelmsson, 381. For similar findings regarding 
consumers in the US: AH Raymond, ‘Yeah, but did you see the gorilla? Creating and protecting an informed consumer in cross-
border online dispute resolution’ 19 Harvard Negotiation Law Review 129, 138–146.
 48 See infra the example of EOS Token disclosure, Subsection 2.2.
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2.2 Overstretching the Average: Just How Informed Should a Consumer Be?
Based on the above, the EU standard for consumer protection addresses more the responsibility of consum-
ers themselves to either keep or become informed, whilst protection is available only if the consumer was 
unable to make an informed decision. If consumers prove unable to take sufficient care in their decision-
making, they bear all the consequences. The consumer is free to ignore all information and make a bad 
decision, if his capability to make an informed decision was not appreciably impaired.49  Nevertheless, when 
it comes to financial, complex agreements, the average consumer needs more than technical standard terms 
to discern their meaning and consequences.50 
Some authors noticed ‘the ECJ’s tendency to impose an obligation on the consumer to take responsibility 
for protecting his own interests.’51 They further pointed out that, ‘The consumer, who has a right to infor-
mation […] must also take note of this information and consider it.’52 This position of the Court raises the 
question whether consumer protection turned into a self-help mechanism for the majority of consumers, 
from vulnerable groups upwards. Additionally, one may legitimately ask whether an average consumer can 
properly protect their economic interests and make adequate decisions when it comes to financial services 
or digital financial products.53 It is certain that by assuming consumers are rational in their decision making 
process and responsible for their own actions, the liability of traders is greatly reduced.54 Thus, while the 
‘average consumer’ standard might boost consumers’ ego as self-determined beings,55 free from paternalis-
tic protection, in reality, it increases their responsibility, while decreasing that of the traders and allows the 
resources of authorities to be diverted towards other areas. 
In a consumer financial protection setting, the authority appears to tolerate certain practices, which con-
sumers are expected to read through, the emphasis being on the authority’s expectation and not as much 
on the actual result of the practice employed by traders. 
Thus, the ‘average consumer’ concept is nothing but ‘a normative abstraction, derived from an economic 
fiction that has little in common with the behavior of the real average consumer.’56 Or, as the Advocate 
General Geelhoed put it in his Opinion rendered in Douwe Egberts v Westrom Pharma, the average con-
sumer benchmark is not meant to reflect actual consumer behavior, but rather it is a reflection of a desired 
behavior.57 His position is also confirmed by the fact that the UCPD did not require Member States to pro-
vide individual remedies to consumers and appeared to focus more on protection of presumed collective 
interests of consumers.58 Only by rejecting any potential differences between individuals, which might have 
justified case by case solutions, was the UCPD able to create and promote its ‘one size fits all’ standard of 
average consumer. 
Nevertheless, there are no factors to indicate whether the desired behavior is realistic or how it could be 
achieved. As Poncibo and Incardona noticed, while the average consumer ‘reflects the economists’ idealistic 
paradigm of a rational consumer in an efficient marketplace […] [it] departs from the unpredictable realities 
of individual human behavior and is hardly an appropriate standard for legislative or judicial sanctions.’59
Conclusively, in the history of EU consumer law, the consumer benchmark has been constantly shifting as 
the expectation that the consumer should take responsibility for protecting his own interests has increased. 
From a generally weaker party in need of protection, the threshold was raised to a distinction between the 
average and a vulnerable consumer (where only the latter is deemed in need of additional protection)60 and 
 49 Trzaskowski, 10.
 50 See Decision in Case C-26/13 – Arpad Kasler, Hajnalka Kaslerne Rabai v. OTP Jelzalogbank Zrt, Para 71, available online at: https://
eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:62013CJ0026&from=EN, accessed 28 June 2018.
 51 H Schulte-Nölke, A casebook on European consumer law (Hart Publishing, Oxford 2002), 114. Also: Dani, 6.
 52 Schulte-Nölke, 114. 
 53 The potential changes implied by digitization were briefly touched upon also by Trzaskowski, p. 12. Regarding the effects of the 
increasing complexity of financial products and the challenges of digitization, see Lefevre and Chapman, 8–10. 
 54 Poncibo and Incardona, 30.
 55 Behavior studies reveal for instance that one of the biases many people display is overconfidence in their ability to successfully 
make accurate financial decisions, such as picking winning stocks. Lefevre and Chapman, p. 13. Hence, adopting a high standard 
for average consumers is likely to feed this type of bias. 
 56 Trzaskowski, 9.
 57 Case C-239/02, Opinion of Advocate General Geelhoed, delivered on 11 December 2003, para 79, <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/
legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:62002CC0239&from=EN>, accessed on 29 October 2018.
 58 Duivenvoorde, 54, Trzaskowski, 2.
 59 Poncibo and Incardona, p. 35.
 60 Recitals 18 and 19 corroborated with Art 5, Para 3 of UCPD.
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appears to head into the direction of a ‘responsible consumer’,61 obliged, not just expected, to take care of 
himself. Micklitz calls this phenomenon ‘the move […] from consumer protection law (which sees the con-
sumer as the weaker party) to consumer law without protection (which considers the consumer an active 
market participant).’62
In parallel with the expansion of expectations and burdens placed on the consumer, the instruments of 
protection appear to be constantly limited to providing the consumer with information, without adequately 
considering his capacity to comprehend it.63 The shortcomings of the information paradigm are even more 
apparent in the case of financial products or digital financial services, involving a high level of complexity.
3 The Responsible Consumer: A Janus-Faced Concept
By 2012, the European Parliament noted that ‘the notion of ‘average consumer’ lacked the flexibility to adapt 
to specific cases and that it did not correspond to real-life situations.’64 A reconsideration of the concept and 
new policies are needed, although so far, no such measures have been adopted. On the contrary, when it 
comes to financial services, the information paradigm was not only maintained, but expanded. Recent nor-
mative acts, such as the Mortgage Directive, and policy documents place additional emphasis on education 
of consumers in general,65 and on financial education, in particular.66 
3.1 From an Average to a Responsible Consumer
At first glance, education would help strengthen the consumer’s capability to discern through the complex 
information coming from service providers. A closer look would reveal that it is just an additional burden 
for consumers who need to keep up to date with relevant information. For instance, in the aftermath of 
the financial crisis, the European Parliament noted ‘the crucial role of financial education,’67 while the new 
Mortgage Directive68 speaks of the consumer as ‘a responsible borrower’, in charge not only of fully under-
standing the standard terms and conditions, but also for (his own) financial education.69 
The European Parliament’s view is contradicted by recent studies, which show that if the consumer is not 
sufficiently financially literate,70 he will receive even less relevant information from advisors or financial 
institutions, in comparison to most knowledgeable investors.71 While this might serve as an argument for 
raising the levels of financial literacy, it also proves that information provided does not offer protection, 
 61 For more details regarding the concept of ‘responsible consumer’, see Section 2 of this paper.
 62 Micklitz in Leczykiewicz, 29.
 63 For a discussion on the ineffectiveness of the informed consumer concept see: Poncibo and Incardona, 31–33.
 64 European Parliament resolution of 22 May 2012 on a strategy for strengthening the rights of vulnerable consumers (2011/2272(INI)), 
Para 3, <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=TA&reference=P7-TA-2012-0209&language=EN>, accessed 28 
June 2018.
 65 ‘Emphasizes the need to empower consumers by providing them with useful, targeted and understandable information; insists 
that the EU and national authorities, and consumer organizations and companies, need to step up their efforts to improve con-
sumer education; calls on the Commission to propose ‘consumer-friendly’ Single Market legislation, so as to ensure that con-
sumer interests are fully taken into account in the functioning of the Single Market’. See: European Parliament resolution of 15 
November 2011 on a new strategy for consumer policy (2011/2149(INI)), Para 21, <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.
do?type=TA&reference=P7-TA-2011-0491&language=GA&ring=A7-2011-0369>, accessed 28 June 2018.
 66 ‘Stresses the importance of access to financial education and financial advice […]’, Id Para 38.
 67 Id Para 37.
 68 Directive 2014/17/EU on Credit Agreements for Consumers Relating to Residential Immovable Property, consolidated, (Mortgage 
Directive), <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:02014L0017-20180101&from=EN>, accessed 28 
June 2018.
 69 As per Recital 29 the task is prima facie shared between Member States, the Commission and consumers: ‘In order to increase the 
ability of consumers to make informed decisions for themselves about borrowing and managing debt responsibly, Member States 
should promote measures to support the education of consumers in relation to responsible borrowing and debt management in 
particular relating to mortgage credit agreements. […] In that regard, the Commission should identify examples of best practices to 
facilitate the further development of measures to enhance consumers’ financial awareness.’ However, in the absence of liability for 
Member States or the Commission for failure to educate consumers, the latter bear the burden of educating themselves. See also 
Art 6 of Mortgage Directive.
 70 For instance, in the 2014 Report from the Commission on the implementation of Directive 2008/48/EC on credit agreements for 
consumers, p 6, <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52014DC0259&from=EN>, accessed on 28 
June 2018, it was noted that ‘the APR is [presupposed] likely to help a consumer (if sufficiently financially literate) to compare dif-
ferent offers and make an informed decision.’ Per a contrario, those consumers who are not sufficiently literate in finance, cannot 
compare and thus, cannot be deemed to have made an informed decision. 
 71 R Calcagno and C Monticone, ‘Financial literacy and the demand for financial advice’ 50 Journal Of Banking & Finance 363, 364; 
U Bhattacharya and others, ‘Is Unbiased Financial Advice to Retail Investors Sufficient? Answers from a Large Field Study’ [Oxford 
University Press/USA] 25 Review of Financial Studies 975, 1017.
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because it is both insufficient and incomprehensible, which reduces to rubbles the entire fundament of 
the information paradigm. This issue led authors across the Atlantic to suggest that where consumers have 
limited financial literacy it would make sense from a policy perspective ‘to encourage contractual terms for 
mortgages that are less likely to cause later regret.’72 In other words, consumer financial protection needs to 
supplement regulated standard information with regulation of standard contracts.73 So far, this view is not 
shared on this side of the Atlantic. 
The Mortgage Directive assumes the financial crisis was caused by more than the irresponsible behavior 
of market participants (consumers, financial institutions and investors).74 At its core was the irresponsible 
usage of financial innovation and newly designed instruments75 – such as subprime mortgages76 – whose 
long-term effects were either hardly comprehensible to professionals, or over-used and abused by them for 
immediate financial gain.77 Based on the above, the European Commission found that ‘many consumers 
have lost confidence in the financial sector’ and proposed a set of measures to restore it.78 It further noted 
that ‘some problems concerned credits denominated in foreign currency which consumers had taken out 
in that currency, […] but without having adequate information about or understanding of the exchange rate 
risk involved.’79 
However, the main issues identified do not mention the professionals who offered the products knowing 
what kind of risks they pose.80 Instead they focus on market and regulatory failures, the general economic 
climate and the low level of financial literacy of the consumer (emphasis added).81 The blame does not fall on 
the financiers who knowingly granted bad mortgage loans for immediate gains (this matter is left to self-
regulation), but on the consumer-debtor, who did not understand the reasons that determined the bank to 
grant the loan and allowed himself to become over-indebted. The solution proposed by the Commission 
is ‘to provide for measures to ensure that consumers are aware of the risk they are taking on and that the 
consumers have the possibility to limit their exposure to exchange rate risk during the lifetime of the credit’ 
(emphasis added).82
This perception, which clearly states that more information would have alleviated all risks, is staggering 
in its narrow-mindedness. One cannot honestly believe that the financial crisis would have been avoided if 
consumers would have had more understanding of the currency exchange risk or securitization. Nor can one 
assume that a new crisis can be prevented by printing flyers and organizing seminars or TV-ads campaigns 
to educate consumers about credit and finance. 
The explanation resides in the fact that regulatory reaction to financial innovation (hence also the con-
comitant financial education) occurs solely ex post as legislators try to keep up with it. It also fails to consider 
the interconnectivities of the global market, of which the EU internal market is just a part, unable to insulate 
itself of tidal shocks, such as the one coming from across the Atlantic in 2008. 
 72 Campbell and others, 5.
 73 The emphasis here is on the word supplement. As standard mortgages are also affected by problems (see ibid. p. 8) and would 
preclude the emergence of better types of mortgages, relying entirely on regulated products would also prove inefficient in the 
long run. However, a combination of mandatory disclosures, comprehensible information and standard terms should improve the 
financial protection offered to consumers, notwithstanding the level of their financial literacy. On the need for state intervention 
in regulation of standardized contracts see also, Irina Domurath, ‘A Map of Responsible Lending and Responsible Borrowing in the 
EU and Suggestions for a Stronger Legal Framework to Prevent Over-Indebtedness of European Consumers’, in HW Micklitz and I 
Domurath, Consumer Debt and Social Exclusion in Europe (Taylor & Francis, 2016), 158.
 74 Recital 3 of Mortgage Directive.
 75 C Whalen, The Subprime Crisis: Cause, Effect and Consequences (2008), 3–9.
 76 Ibid. 9–10.
 77 The financial crisis evidenced instances where market players provided loans to consumers knowing that they are likely to default. 
See for instance the case of NINJA loans (‘No Income, No Job or Asset’ loan). This allowed financiers to securitize sub-prime mort-
gages and sell them to investors. The more the bank lent, the more it could sell. Hence, for the lenders, in the short-run, it was a 
good business decision, but one that consumers were ultimately left to pay. See for instance: M Simkovic, ‘Competition and Crisis 
in Mortgage Securitization’ 88 Indiana Law Journal, 214–215.
 78 Recital 3 of Mortgage Directive.
 79 Recital 4 of Mortgage Directive.
 80 A number of documents leaked from one of the biggest commercial banks in Romania revealed for instance that the banks board 
was fully aware of the high volatility of the Swiss franc’s exchange rate and that the bank’s customers were deliberately encouraged 
to either shift from loans in national currency or Euro to Swiss francs, or to take loans directly in Swiss francs, with the expectation 
of increased profits.
 81 Recital 4 of Mortgage Directive.
 82 Recital 30 of Mortgage Directive.
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If financial literacy is the key, then EU consumers should become experts in global financial markets, not 
just the EU one, to be able to discern between risks and adverse effects of their informed decisions. Yet, 
such expectation is unrealistic. Not only that the financial products and services are increasingly complex, 
but the large array of choice makes comparison extremely difficult because many of them have their own 
specific features. In addition, most of the financial products are one-off purchases83 and the majority of the 
consumers are not ‘repeat actors’, able to learn from their own or from others’ experience. In fact, for many 
of them, a failed experience caused by a bad decision would have catastrophic consequences, resulting in 
loss of home, deficiency payments, decrease in life-style and income, which would deter or preclude them 
from trying again. Last, but not least, financial education might generate effects, but only after education 
has been obtained and with results that are difficult to foresee, given the said complexity and multitude of 
financial products.84 Thus, it offers no respite to those that already acquired a mortgage or are on the verge 
of acquiring one. 
In conclusion, the Mortgage Directive is increasing the threshold for protecting consumers, from average, 
to ‘responsible’ ones. However, the Directive is not fully clear whether ‘responsible borrowing’ should be 
perceived as awareness or liability in case of default. Both meanings deserve additional attention. 
3.1.1 Responsible as in Aware? – The Mortgage Directive and Financial Education
The Mortgage Directive appears to understand ‘responsible borrowing’ as consumer awareness of the risks 
and obligations involved in credit agreements, particularly, mortgages. This reading derives straight from the 
‘information paradigm’ and the ‘average consumer’ standard, as it assumes85 that responsible decisions stem 
from consumers’ ability to make informed decisions. The Directive states that it is this ability that needs to 
be increased by ‘education’ and by enhancing ‘financial awareness.’86 
The second chapter of the Directive is more detailed on what education and financial literacy imply: 
information. The panacea for consumers’ lack of adequate understanding of financial products consists of 
three elements combined: 1) ‘clear and general information on the credit granting process […] to guide con-
sumers’; 2) ‘information regarding the guidance that consumer organizations and national authorities may 
provide’ and; 3) Commission’s ‘best practices’.87 
In its ‘Briefing on improving the financial literacy of European consumers’, the European Parliament fur-
ther defined the meaning of financial literacy as ‘a combination of awareness, knowledge, skill, attitude and 
behavior necessary to make sound financial decisions and achieve financial well-being.’88 It relied signifi-
cantly on an OECD Policy Paper on Financial Education and the Crisis89 to state that the policy aim should 
be to restore the information imbalance between households and financial institutions by regulating the 
information to be provided to consumers and not the product. In other words, by standardizing information 
to be provided to consumers, instead of implementing also standard contracts regulated by law. Since in the 
Commission’s view consumers and financial institutions shared the blame for the financial crisis, it would 
have made sense to share also some of the risks among them. 
On the positive side, the Mortgage Directive places more emphasis on information provided in clear 
language,90 thus acknowledging the fact that information does not suffice, if it is incomprehensible or inad-
equate for being used by the consumer. It is a signal that compliance with information requirements for the 
sake of compliance is not acceptable as a matter of policy. 
That signal was endorsed by the CJEU in Ruxandra Paula Andriciuc and Others v. Banca Romaneasca SA 
(Andriciuc)91 and OTP Bank Nyrt., OTP Facktoring Koveteleskezelo Zrt v. Terez Ilyes and Emil Kiss (OTP),92 but 
 83 Lefevre and Chapman, 9. 
 84 For a case study on types of mortgages and options available to consumers, see Campbell and others, 5–9.
 85 Recital 29 corroborated with Art 6 of Mortgage Directive. Also: Irina Domurath, ‘A Map of Responsible Lending and Responsible 
Borrowing in the EU and Suggestions for a Stronger Legal Framework to Prevent Over-Indebtedness of European Consumers’ in 
Micklitz and Domurath, 161.
 86 Id.
 87 Art 6 of Mortgage Directive.
 88 European Parliament Briefing, ‘Improving the financial literacy of European consumers’, May 2015, 2 (EP Briefing), <http://www.
europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2015/557020/EPRS_BRI(2015)557020_EN.pdf>, accessed 28 June 2018.
 89 OECD International Network on Financial Education, ‘Financial Education and the Crisis. Policy Paper and Guidance’, June 2009 
(OECD Policy Paper), <https://www.oecd.org/finance/financial-education/50264221.pdf>, accessed 28 June 2018.
 90 See Recital 41 of Mortgage Directive.
 91 Case C-186/16, Decision of 20 September 2017.
 92 Case C-51/17, Decision 20 September 2018.
Stănescu 59 
also world-wide by a number of jurisdictions.93 In Andriciuc and OTP the Court held that ‘a contractual term 
[…] drafted in plain intelligible language requires, in the case of loan agreements, financial institutions to 
provide borrowers with sufficient information to enable them to take prudent and well-informed decisions’ 
and:
‘must be understood by the consumer both at the formal and grammatical level, and also in terms 
of its actual effects, so that the average consumer, who is reasonably well informed and reasonably 
observant and circumspect, would be aware […] and […] able to assess the potentially significant 
economic consequences of such a term with regard to his financial obligations.’94
However, presenting information in a clear language must now be paired with a pro-active approach on the 
consumers’ side. As the OECD paper pointed out and the European Parliament re-stated, the financial crisis 
provided ‘a teachable moment’, a hard lesson that should make households more willing to learn about the 
long-term complex risks and financial issues than they would have been in normal circumstances.95 Put 
bluntly, although the main losers of the financial crisis generated by professionals, consumers must now 
improve their expertise in financial products. In fact, they are expected to become active players on stock 
markets, become well versed in the activity of private pension funds or with the mechanism behind credit 
cards, because empirical studies associate failure to do so with a low level of financial literacy.96 The pro-
active stance is further underlined by the European Parliament’s call for ‘building up financially literate con-
sumer organizations able to counterbalance the role of business in the process of preparing regulations.’97
The idea of using education in connection to consumer protection is not new and is featured in the TFEU. 
The text speaks of the Union’s obligation to ensure a high level of consumer protection as well as to promote 
their right to information and education (emphasis added).98 It must be noticed that the TFEU uses the col-
location as well as, not by, which means that in the view of the TFEU’s drafters, consumer protection and 
the rights to information and education are complementary, not means to an end. Nevertheless, the current 
policy trend of the EU Parliament seems to be that consumer protection is to be achieved through information 
and education, not together with them. This is a clear deviation from the drafters’ intention and constitutes 
another evidence of the shift towards a responsible consumer. 
In this article’s view, consumer education does not amount to high level of consumer protection. One 
cannot promise protection and replace it with classes on financial education. For instance, in a 2003 Speech 
titled ‘Principles of Consumer Protection in the European Union’, David Byrne, the Commissioner for Health 
and Consumer Protection at the time, stated that of all five consumer rights,99 ‘the right to education has 
[…] been somewhat overlooked.’100 His solution was to ‘develop interactive teaching modules on European 
consumer issues […][that] can be used in adult education’ and to ‘seek to develop similar consumer-related 
teaching modules for schools and higher education’.101 In 2003, consumer protection was still not condi-
tioned on education and literacy, but that changed after the financial crisis.102 
That consumers are in fact expected to protect themselves by ‘going back to school’ and getting a ‘finan-
cial education’ is also apparent from the European Commission’s initiatives or from the European Economic 
and Social Committee’s call for mandatory financial education.103 Among them is the Dolceta online educa-
tion tool, currently integrated in the Consumer Classroom education website, which provided a module on 
 93 Campbell and others, 15 (‘Disclosure needs to be salient and easy to understand’); Sandlant, 44. ‘It’s not just that we need ‘plain 
English’, we need ‘stark language’ because sometimes the message needs to be really clear and unambiguous.’
 94 Case C-186/16, Decision of 20 September 2017, and Case C-51/17, Decision 20 September 2018.
 95 See OECD Policy Paper, 7 and EP Briefing, 3.
 96 EP Briefing, 3.
 97 EP Briefing, 5. 
 98 Art 169, Para 1 TFEU.
 99 The five fundamental rights of consumers established in 1975 were: 1) the protection of consumers’ health and safety; 2) the 
protection of consumers’ economic interests; 3) consumers’ right to information and education; 4) consumers’ right to redress; 
and 5) consumer representation and participation. See European Commission, Press Release Database, <http://europa.eu/rapid/
press-release_MEMO-92-68_en.htm>, accessed on 28 October 2018.
 100 David Byrne, ‘Principles of Consumer Protection in the European Union (Ministerial Meeting on Consumer Policy, Rome, 21 
November 2003, p. 3 <http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-03-561_en.pdf>, accessed 28 June 2018.
 101 Id. at 3, accessed 28 June 2018.
 102 Kastner, 80.
 103 EP Briefing, 6.
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financial services to consumers willing to learn.104 On its own end, the European Parliament takes pride in 
inserting in the prospectus offered in connection to investment products a warning notice making the con-
sumer aware that the product to be purchased is neither simple, nor easy to understand.105 
However, the bulk of methods employed to increase consumer awareness and financial literacy is by ‘organ-
ization of national and regional conferences, seminars, media and awareness campaigns or cross-border 
educational programs’,106 websites, games and apps.107 What none of these measures seems to adequately 
consider is that all of them require tools, time, money and effort from the side of the consumer and that, 
despite their best efforts to learn, they will still be solely responsible for potential negative results. Whilst 
educating future generations of consumers might prove beneficial in a decade or two, for the consumers 
who suffered the consequences of the financial crisis the emphasis on (self) education provides no solution 
and no relief.
3.1.2 Responsible as in Liable? – The Mortgage Directive
It may also be that when talking about responsible borrowing, the drafters of the Mortgage Directive had in 
mind the issue of liability. Thus, whether informed, educated, financially literate or not, the consumer must 
understand he will be bound by the credit agreement entered, if he was provided with information.
A first indication of understanding the term as liability is that the Mortgage Directive speaks of various 
ratios – such as loan-to-value, loan-to-income, debt-to-income – as well as of minimum levels below which 
no credits should be granted.108 These should not be read to mean that lenders will be solely responsible 
when the aforementioned ratios or levels are not observed. Among the causes of the financial crisis, the 
Commission mentioned not only irresponsible lending, but also irresponsible borrowing, placing consum-
ers in the same pool of irresponsible market participants.109 Hence, as part of the problem, consumers are 
deemed to be also part of the solution. They need to observe the ratios and avoid over-indebtedness. 
The responsibility might be shared, but it is not joint. In case of default, the risk of non-payment lies solely 
with the consumer,110 even if the bank granted the credit after conducting a wrong assessment or by choos-
ing to ignore it. The Directive expressly states that ‘[t]he assessment of creditworthiness should not imply 
the transfer of responsibility to the creditor for any subsequent non-compliance by the consumer with his 
obligations under the credit agreement’ (emphasis added),111 thus removing any possibility of risk-sharing or 
normative sanction of creditor’s misconduct. This important aspect affecting the effectiveness and enforce-
ment of the Directive’s provisions is overlooked by lengthier assessments of the meaning of ‘responsible 
borrowing’,112 with the notable exception of Domurath.113  
The second indication stems from the nature of the information to be provided on a mandatory basis, 
mainly the one related to ‘advertising materials, personalized pre-contractual information consisting in 
specific risk warnings, the nature and implication of taking out a security.’114 Lack of understanding of 
what a secured transaction entails may be solved by obtaining a financial education, but once warned, the 
 104 European Commission, Consumer Classroom, Explore Financial Literacy webpage, <https://www.consumerclassroom.eu/
resources/theme/financial-literacy>, accessed 28 June 2018.
 105 European Parliament legislative resolution of 15 April 2014 on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the 
Council on key information documents for investment products (COM(2012)0352 – C7-0179/2012 – 012/0169(COD)), <http://
www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=REPORT&reference=A7-2013-0368&language=EN>, accessed 28 June 2018.
 106 EP Briefing, 5. 
 107 See for instance Financial Education – National Strategies in Europe. Good Practices Report, March 2015, <https://www.ebf.eu/
wp-content/uploads/2017/01/GoodPracticesReport_EuropeanMoneyWeek-FINAL.pdf>, accessed 28 June 2018.
 108 Recital 3 of Mortgage Directive.
 109 Recital 4 of Mortgage Directive.
 110 See also, Irina Domurath, ‘A Map of Responsible Lending and Responsible Borrowing in the EU and Suggestions for a Stronger Legal 
Framework to Prevent Over-Indebtedness of European Consumers’, in Micklitz and Domurath, 166.
 111 Recital 56 of Mortgage Directive.
 112 V Mak, ‘What is Responsible Lending? The EU Consumer Mortgage Credit Directive in the UK and the Netherlands’ 38 Journal of 
Consumer Policy 411, 428. The lack of sanctions regarding the assessment of creditworthiness is not mentioned by Kastner either, 
although the author mentions that originally, the proposal suggested an obligation for lenders to deny credit. The proposal was 
deleted due to strong lobby from European banks. Kastner, 79, 95.
 113 Irina Domurath, ‘A Map of Responsible Lending and Responsible Borrowing in the EU and Suggestions for a Stronger Legal Frame-
work to Prevent Over-Indebtedness of European Consumers’ in Micklitz and Domurath, 163, 165–166.
 114 Recital 22 of Mortgage Directive.
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consumer is bound to suffer all the consequences, notwithstanding what he was able to comprehend from 
the information received.115 
The third argument supporting the idea of liability, stems from one of the final Recitals of the Mortgage 
Directive, which states that ‘Member States may decide to transpose certain aspect covered by this Directive 
in national law by prudential law, for example the creditworthiness assessment of the consumer, while oth-
ers are transposed by civil or criminal law, for example the obligations relating to responsible borrowers.’116 
One may legitimately ask which of the obligations relating to responsible borrowers might be criminalized. A 
potential answer is drawn from corroborating Recital 83 with Recital 58 calling for sanctions where consum-
ers ‘knowingly provide incomplete or incorrect information in order to obtain a positive creditworthiness.’117 
This implies a per a contrario legal obligation from the side of responsible consumers to provide clear and 
correct data that can ease the assessment of their creditworthiness. One must notice that leading consumers 
to believe they could afford a credit and, thus, exposing them to the risk of default would not subject lenders 
to the same type or level of sanctions, which raises the question, who is the Mortgage Directive really trying 
to protect? 
3.2 Responsible and Financially Literate in the Digital Age: Initial Coin Offerings 
Related Risks
So far, the article has shown that in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis – a crisis caused by financial 
innovation and usage of complex financial instruments not fully understood by professionals themselves, 
combined with corporate interests – and of its catastrophic effects for consumers, the answer of the Com-
mission was to provide consumers with more information and to try to convince them to undertake a 
financial education. 
Hence, if financial products are complex, it is the duty of the consumers to elevate themselves to the level 
of understanding required.118 One needs to underline here the word ‘aftermath’, which means these meas-
ures were implemented in full hindsight, looking back, and not as much into the future. The Commission’s 
position is short-sighted, for whatever financial education or protection can be provided to consumers via 
flyers and T.V. commercials cannot insulate them from the risks posed not only by financial innovation, but 
also by digitization or a combination of the two.
An example is that of ICOs, which are currently one of the most important and innovative ways of raising 
capital.119 Their forms vary, the simplest being a scheme employed by creators of new cryptocurrencies to 
raise money from the public. In this case, in exchange for the money provided in traditional currencies,120 
investors receive the new cryptocurrency in return and may make profit of it if its market value increases 
over the price they have initially paid. Nevertheless, more complex ICOs exist, the difference stemming from 
the additional rights received by investors.121 
 115 In addition to information, the consumer is also provided with a minimum amount of time to (re)consider the transaction and its 
implications, during which it can withdraw, or to compare the offer with other credit products. See Recitals 23 and 40 of Mortgage 
Directive. While an effective tool to exit a bad deal, failure to exercise the right to withdraw also shifts all responsibility of the 
agreement on the consumer. The only exceptions appear to be those stemming from the interpretation given by the CJEU in the 
Swiss francs cases referred above. 
 116 Recital 83 of Mortgage Directive.
 117 Recital 58 of Mortgage Directive. 
 118 The reality is that even financial education would not have alleviated the risks for consumers. In Hungary and Romania, prior to the 
2008 financial crisis, it was next to impossible to get but Swiss francs or Euro denominated mortgage loans. Credits in national cur-
rencies were only formally offered, at interest rates that made them unappealing. Moreover, the banks’ employees were instructed 
to do everything to convince clients to make or switch to Swiss francs loans, by emphasizing their immediate benefits and leaving 
out the volatility of the exchange rates. Unfortunately, the EU regulatory bodies and the European scholarship have failed gather 
empirical evidence of such practices, and the former preferred to pass the responsibility to the consumers. 
 119 ESMA Statement of 13th November, available online at: https://www.esma.europa.eu/sites/default/files/library/esma50-157-
829_ico_statement_investors.pdf, p. 2, accessed 28 June 2018. See also: A Gikay, How the New Generation Cryptocurrencies Decoded 
the Investment Contract Code: Analysis of US and EU Laws (2018), 311, 325.
 120 Nowadays, to evade being qualified as investment contracts, ICOs require payment only in cryptocurrency (which, presumably, do 
not constitute ‘money’. This solution did not stop the US SEC to make the same judgement concerning ICOs (SEC v. Shavers, et al. 
2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 130781 (E.D. Tex., Sept. 18, 2014), case note <http://www.thompsonhine.com/uploads/1137/doc/ECLR_Vol-
ume_14_Issue_5_pg_22.pdf>, accessed 28 June 2018), while the EU is still to take a stance on the matter. For details see also: ibid. 
321, 327–328 and A Gikay, Regulating Decentralized Cryptocurrencies Under Payment Services Law: Lessons from European Union 
Law, Case Western Reserve Journal of Law, Technology & the Internet, Vol. 9, 2018 (2018), 2.
 121 For details and examples see: Gikay, How the New Generation Cryptocurrencies Decoded the Investment Contract Code: Analysis of US 
and EU Laws, 311, 325–327.
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It is beyond the purpose of this article to investigate ICOs.122 What the article is trying to show by refer-
ring to this financial digital product, is the range of consumer protection issues stemming from their usage 
and accessibility to virtually any Internet user. In the EU, these financial instruments are almost completely 
unregulated, as the relevant bodies cannot yet determine the legal classification of the products/tokens 
created by ICOs, which would then enable them to establish a legal regime. EU institutions do not have a 
pro-active approach and lag behind their counterparts in the U.S. Although there is no definition of invest-
ment contracts in the Securities Act123 or in the Securities Exchange Commission Act,124 US courts and the 
SEC widely rely on the test established by the US Supreme Court in SEC v Howey Co.125 In the absence of 
a similar test to aid courts in their judicial assessment, EU consumers are exposed to potential abuses and 
lack adequate protection.126 This is best emphasized by the weak response from the European Securities and 
Markets Authority (ESMA), a counterpart (yet not entirely an equivalent) of the SEC, to the kind of threats 
posed to consumers by ICOs. For a better understanding, this section will first investigate ESMA’s role and 
powers, after which it will analyze the ESMA’s reaction to the threats posed by ICO’s. 
3.2.1 ESMA and Its Role in Consumer Financial Protection
ESMA was established127 after the financial crisis exposed the shortcomings of financial supervision at Union 
level128 as part of the efforts to improve the protection of citizens and rebuilding trust in the financial system 
by reforming the structure of supervision of the financial sector.129 ESMA should ensure a high, effective and 
consistent level of regulation and supervision taking into account, among other factors, ‘the different nature 
of financial market participants’, it should protect ‘the transparency of markets and financial products’ and 
the ‘investors’ for the benefit of the economy in general and of the financial institutions and consumers in 
particular.130 
Of importance are ESMA’s responsibilities regarding new financial activities. For instance, ‘the Authority 
should be able to temporarily prohibit or restrict certain financial activities that threaten the orderly func-
tioning and the integrity of financial markets or the stability of the whole or part of the financial system in 
the Union.’131 Prima facie, this appears sufficiently broad to enable ESMA to tackle any new financial prod-
uct generated by the digital age (such as ICOs). However, ESMA’s powers in this regard are curbed by the 
requirement that the financial activities in question represent a systemic risk at Union level.132 Moreover, 
the authority is to consider the impact of its activities on both ‘competition and innovation within the mar-
ket [and] the Union’s global competitiveness’ every time it makes a decision, which ultimately implies that 
ESMA is more restrained by business considerations, than it is concerned with the welfare of consumers. As 
it will be seen, this is reflected in the minimalistic approach of ESMA towards financial innovation. 
This does not mean that consumers could not benefit from ESMA’s activity, as protection of the financial 
market and adoption and implementation of technical standards,133 guidelines or recommendations134 indi-
rectly protect consumers as well. For example, ‘in areas not covered by regulatory or implementing stand-
ards, ESMA has the power to issue guidelines and recommendations on the application of Union law’,135 the 
latter aspect lying at the ‘core [of] the integrity, transparency, efficiency and orderly functioning of financial 
 122 For a detailed and in-depth analysis of ICOs see: P Hacker and C Thomale, Crypto-Securities Regulation: ICOs, Token Sales and Cryp-
tocurrencies under EU Financial Law (2017).
 123 The Securities Act, 1933, Section 2, letter a), point 1.
 124 The Security Exchange Act, 1934, Section 3, letter a), point 10.
 125 US Supreme Court, SEC v Howey Co. [1946], 328 US 293. For a detailed discussion of the Howey test see Gikay, How the New Genera-
tion Cryptocurrencies Decoded the Investment Contract Code: Analysis of US and EU Laws, 311, 328–330.
 126 Ibid. 342–343.
 127 See Regulation (EU) no 1095/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 November 2010 establishing a European 
Supervisory Authority (European Securities and Markets Authority), amending Decision no 716/2009/EC and repealing Commis-
sion Decision 2009/77/EC (ESMA Regulation). 
 128 Recital 1 of ESMA Regulation.
 129 Recital 3 of ESMA Regulation.
 130 Recital 11 and Art 1, Para 5 of ESMA Regulation.
 131 Recital 12 and Art 9, Para 5 of ESMA Regulation.
 132 Recital 15 provides a definition for system risk seen as: ‘a risk of disruption in the financial system with the potential to have serious 
negative consequences for the internal market and the real economy.’ See also Art 1, Para 5 and Art 23 of ESMA Regulation.
 133 Art 10 and 15 of ESMA Regulation.
 134 Art 16 of ESMA Regulation.
 135 Recital 26 and Art 8, Para 2 of ESMA Regulation.
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markets, the stability of the financial system and for the neutral conditions of competition for financial 
market participants in the Union.’136
In addition, there are also normative tasks specifically related to consumer protection and financial activi-
ties.137 These are mainly based on the information paradigm and the general wisdom that financial education 
is the key to consumer protection. Thus, they are focused on ensuring transparency, simplicity and fairness 
in the market for financial products or services in the EU: ‘collecting, analyzing and reporting on consumer 
trends; reviewing and coordinating financial literacy and education initiatives; developing training stand-
ards in the industry; aiding in developing common disclosure rules.’138 However, as it will be shown139 the 
information paradigm is unfit for the ICOs market, because ICO white papers use a technical slang that even 
professional investors might not be able to understand.
In regard to novel financial activities, ESMA’s activity comprises of monitoring, issuing guidelines, recom-
mendations or warnings, provided a financial activity poses a serious threat to the objectives the Authority 
is set to protect.140 To tackle financial innovation, ESMA was enabled to establish a Committee on finan-
cial innovation, bringing together experts from national supervisory authorities.141 Ultimately,142 beside the 
temporary bans or restrictions of certain financial activities, ESMA may also asses the need to permanently 
prohibit or restrict them in cooperation with the EU Commission.143
Summarizing, ESMA has at its disposal a wide range of powers concerning risks posed by financial inno-
vation. However, these powers are curbed both by the Regulation’s provisions regarding the existence of 
systemic risk, the principle of complementarity and the bureaucratic hurdles at EU level. In regard to con-
sumer financial protection, ESMA fits perfectly into the general view that consumers are better protected 
from dangers posed by financial innovation when provided with transparent information regarding risks 
and financial education to better comprehend such risks than by direct intervention on the market, which 
is reserved as a remedy of last resort.  
The minimalist approach of ESMA towards such new and dangerous financial instruments is best exem-
plified by its attitude towards ICOs, deeply contrasting with that of its counterpart in the US, the SEC. After 
several years from their emergence the specialized Committee on financial innovation settled for a two 
pages warning on the risks of ICO’s.144  This is addressed in the following subsection.
3.2.2 Consumer Financial Protection by Warning
As already said, ESMA’s position towards ICOs is limited to a warning published in November 2017, alerting 
investors of ‘the high risk of losing all of their invested capital.’145 The statement is addressed to those who 
‘[…] are considering investing in ICOs or have already done so […],’146 which means that for at least one cat-
egory of consumers, ESMA’s reaction is tardive and useless for it offers no remedy.
In this instance, the inadequacy of the information paradigm is underlined by two facts. The first is that 
in the case of ICOs (as well as other digital financial products) the main piece of information provided to 
the consumer is that … there is no protection, because the legislators and regulators have failed to address 
 136 Recital 27 of ESMA Regulation. In this regard, ESMA is provided with investigative and recommendation powers regarding national 
supervisory authorities, but also with the capacity to adopt decisions addressed to individual financial market participants (Recit-
als 28 and 29) and to require national authorities to take specific remedial actions (Recital 31). However, the former is affected by 
the principle of complementarity (Recital 39) and must be used in exceptional circumstances when the competent authorities fail 
to take the adequate measures recommended by the authority and formally opinioned by the EU Commission (See also Art 18 of 
ESMA Regulation).
 137 Art 9 of ESMA Regulation.
 138 Art 9, Para 1 of ESMA Regulation.
 139 Subsection 2.2.2.
 140 Art 9, Paras 2 and 3 of ESMA’s Regulation.
 141 Art 9, Para 4 corroborated with.
 142 Consumers are also part of the Securities and Markets Stakeholder Group (SMSG) established by Art 37 of ESMA Regulation. The 
SMSG is to be consulted on actions taken under Arts 10–15 of ESMA Regulation regarding adoption and implementation of tech-
nical standards and may issue opinions and advice to ESMA that do not have a mandatory or a binding character. See for instance 
SMSG’s Advice to ESMA – Own Initiative Report on Initial Coin Offerings and Crypto-Assets, issued on 19.10.2018, ESMA 22-106-
1338 (SMSG ICO Advice), available online at: https://www.esma.europa.eu/sites/default/files/library/esma22-106-1338_smsg_
advice_-_report_on_icos_and_crypto-assets.pdf, accessed on 13.12.2018.
 143 Art 9, Para 5 of ESMA Regulation.
 144 For details see infra Subsection 2.2.2.
 145 ESMA Statement of 13th November 2017, 1, <https://www.esma.europa.eu/sites/default/files/library/esma50-157-828_ico_state-
ment_firms.pdf>, accessed 29 October 2018.
 146 Id 1.
The Responsible Consumer in the Digital Age64
these financial instruments.147 ESMA’s statement repeats it on several occasions: ‘In particular, be aware that 
you will have no protection in the case where the ICO is unregulated’, ‘ICOs, depending on how they are 
structured may fall outside of the regulated space, in which case investors do not benefit from the protec-
tion that comes with regulated investments,’ and ‘[d]epending on how they are structured, ICOs may not be 
captured by the existing rules and may fall outside the regulated space […] In the case where an ICO does not 
fall under the scope of EU laws and regulations, investors cannot benefit from the protection […].’148 Given 
its regulatory powers, ESMA should have done more about it, than to issue a warning.
The second stems from the fact that given the failure of the legislators to address and respond quickly to 
the problems posed to consumer protection by new financial instruments in a digital era,149 even the infor-
mation received by the consumers may not protect them. As ESMA puts it: 
‘The information that is made available to investors, e.g. in so-called white papers, is in most cases 
unaudited, incomplete, unbalanced or even misleading. It typically puts the emphasis on the poten-
tial benefits, but not the risks. It is technical and not easily comprehensible. Investors may therefore 
not understand the risks that they are taking and make investments that are not appropriate to 
their needs.’150 
The issue of misleading information has been raised by empirical studies as well. After analyzing more than 
50 ICO’s, Cohney et al found discrepancies between promises made in white papers and the concomitant 
smart contracts’ coding.151 Yet, scholars cannot substitute law makers and regulatory bodies, which is why 
the two pages warning of ESMA cannot constitute an adequate response.
How the problem of making technical information comprehensible for consumers may be addressed 
remains a mystery, as one may dispute even ESMA’s capability of explaining ICOs in a clear simple language. 
ESMA’s statement defines an ICO as ‘an innovative way of raising money from the public, using coins or 
tokens. […] The coins or tokens are typically created and disseminated using distributed ledger or blockchain 
technology (DLT).’152 The usage of technical slang – tokens, distributed ledger or blockchain – cannot be 
deemed comprehensible, and many consumers – whether financially literate or not – would have problems 
understanding it, even if the information provided would be entirely accurate. 
This is just the beginning. ESMA warns also of additional risks associated with ICO investments, such as 
vulnerability to fraud and illicit activities, high risk of losing all the invested capital, lack of exit options 
and extreme price volatility, or flaws in the technology used. Nevertheless, the two pages written in plain 
language, in a concise and clear manner, not only come too late given that ICOs were already offered to 
EU consumers, but also their ‘consumer beware’ approach does not seem to function. By 2017 blockchain 
projects raised no less than 1,6 billion dollars via ICOs,153 which makes them a dangerous, yet very desirable 
and frequently consumed forbidden fruit, for both consumers and businesses. Conspicuously, just because 
consumers chose to invest in ICOs or other unregulated financial products, it does not mean they are auto-
matically harmed by them. However, one cannot overlook the fact that in cases where problems would arise, 
the EU consumers would be left to suffer the consequences.
As shown before, a potential explanation for the appeal of risky financial products to consumers, lies in 
the trader’s ability to either alleviate consumers’ concerns or to shift consumers’ attention towards certain 
aspects of the product or service. In other words, beside the skill of the trader in gaining the trust of the 
consumers or misusing their blind faith in the protection from the authority, the additional benefits stem-
ming from the information are sufficient to change their perspective with regard to the risks involved. 
Nevertheless, real life examples prove things are much more complicated.
 147 Gikay, How the New Generation Cryptocurrencies Decoded the Investment Contract Code: Analysis of US and EU Laws, 311, 328.
 148 Id 1.
 149 ESMA’s statement came only after a plunge of 29% in the value of Bitcoin and was not doubled by any bans or measures 
similar to those taken by the US SEC. See: Roger Aitken, EU Regulator Follows US SEC with Stark ‘ICO Risk’ Warnings, Forbes, 
Nov 13, 2017, <https://www.forbes.com/sites/rogeraitken/2017/11/13/eu-regulator-follows-u-s-sec-with-stark-ico-risk-
warnings/#521752505ead>, accessed on 28.06.2018.
 150 Id 2. 
 151 Cohney, Shaanan and Hoffman, David A. and Sklaroff, Jeremy and Wishnick, David, Coin-Operated Capitalism (July 17, 2018). 
Columbia Law Review, Forthcoming; U of Penn, Inst for Law & Econ Research Paper No. 18–37, p. 51. Available at SSRN: https://
ssrn.com/abstract=3215345 or https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3215345, accessed on 05.12.2018.
 152 Id 2.
 153 Chuan Tian, ‘$1.6 Billion> All-Time ICO Funding Climbs as Record $500 Million Invested in July, Coindesk (4 August 2017) <https://
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One should take, for instance, the EOS Token Purchase Agreement154 where it is clearly stated, with capital 
letters, that ‘Purchase of EOS tokens are non-refundable, and purchases may not be cancelled. Buyer may 
lose all amounts paid’; ‘EOS tokens may have no value’, ‘Company reserves the right to refuse or cancel EOS 
token purchase requests at any time in its sole discretion’.155 The EOS Token Purchase Agreement, neither 
hides nor minimizes the risks involved by the transaction. It insists on consumer awareness, just like EU 
institutions.156 
The company restates the fact that tokens may have no value and buyer may lose all amounts paid, and 
provides a non-exhaustive list of concomitant risks related to the functionality of features of the tokens, the 
stability of the EOS Platform, the token price and its tradability, the timing of the block-chain production, 
periodic congestions of the blockchain, the token’s security, third-party reliance, changes in software, pro-
ject completion, or the uncertainty of the regulatory framework or of governmental action.157 This long list 
of risks and investor concerns158 did not preclude EOS from becoming one of the most successful ICOs. After 
just one year-long token sale, it managed to raise almost 4 billion dollars,159 even if the product’s release was 
significantly delayed and affected by technical issues.160 Although one cannot exclude the possibility that 
consumers consciously accepted to assume the risks, consumers’ aversion towards risky investments sug-
gests this likelihood is rather low and the explanation must be sought elsewhere. 
Where does the money come from? According to the EOS Token Purchase Agreement, not from US or 
China, as ‘EOS Tokens are not being offered or distributed to US persons […] or Chinese persons […].’161 The 
explanation for the exclusion of these categories of consumers comes from the regulatory framework appli-
cable in the two jurisdictions, which the offer is trying to avoid. That means the target will be consumers 
from other parts of the globe, EU included. 
Where would financial literacy fit in case of a financial digital product? The EOS Tokens Purchase Agreement 
seems to indicate that its product is addressed solely to experienced and knowledgeable consumers, well 
versed not only in business and finance, but also in digitization and technology. In its Representations and 
Warranties of Buyer section, the Purchase Agreement states that:
‘Buyer has sufficient knowledge and experience in business and financial matters, including sufficient 
understanding of blockchain or cryptographic tokens and other digital assets, smart contracts, storage 
mechanisms (such as digital or token wallets), blockchain-based software systems and blockchain 
technology, to be able to evaluate the risks and merits of Buyer’s purchase […]’ (emphasis added).162 
Just how many consumers understand all the above, is difficult to evaluate. What is certain in this article’s 
view, is that a two-page warning from ESMA can hardly be considered adequate protection, unless combined 
with product regulation or clear guidelines, as suggested by Gikay.163  
Such staggering amounts of money raised by EOS via Token sales brings back the old question: why do 
consumers ignore the risks? Why does the information provided to them not have a deterrent effect? Since 
there is no apparent logic behind it, and there is no hard evidence to support the idea that the consumers 
overnight, became so literate in digital financial products that they can see beyond the concerns of the 
regulators, the explanation must come from other areas, beyond legal science, such as behavioral studies. 
 154 EOS Token Purchase Agreement <https://eos.io/documents/block.one%20-%20EOS%20Token%20Purchase%20Agreement%20
-%20September%204,%202017.pdf>, accessed 28 June 2018.
 155 See Id, ‘Important Information’ section. 
 156 Art 5.6 ‘Buyer Knowledge and Risks of Project’.
 157 Id Article 7: Risks.
 158 https://steemit.com/eos/@cob/shedding-some-light-on-the-eos-token-purchase-agreement, accessed 28 June 2018
 159 Paul Vigna, ‘Investors Bet $4 Billion on a Cryptocurrency Startup’, The Wall Street Journal, (29 May 2018), <https://www.wsj.com/
articles/investors-bet-4-billion-on-a-cryptocurrency-startup-1527591600?mod=e2tw>, accessed 28 June 2018.
 160 Brady Dale, ‘EOS Is Launched But Not Yet Live – Why?’, Coindesk, (12 June 2018),  <https://www.coindesk.com/eos-launched-not-
yet-live-heres/>, accessed 20 October 2018.
 161 See EOS Token Purchase Agreement, ‘Important Information’ section corroborated with Article 2 (Distribution), Section 2 ‘No US 
or Chinese Buyers’ and Article 5 (Representation and Warranties), Section 1 ‘Not a US Person or a Chinese Person.’
 162 Id Art 5.6.
 163 Gikay categorizes ESMA as a ‘passive observer’ in comparison to the US SEC. He argues that ‘given the complexity of the issue [of 
ICOs] and the need to have legal clarity and to protect the market and consumers/investors from abusive behaviors, the ESMA 
should have given detailed guideline by now.’ Gikay, How the New Generation Cryptocurrencies Decoded the Investment Contract 
Code: Analysis of US and EU Laws, 311, 328 and Gikay, Regulating Decentralized Cryptocurrencies Under Payment Services Law: Les-
sons from European Union Law, Case Western Reserve Journal of Law, Technology & the Internet, Vol. 9, 2018, 18.
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The EU regulators cannot just sit on the side, issue warnings, and call it the ‘high level of consumer protec-
tion’ promised in the Treaty. They need to act and regulate or ban potentially harmful products.
4 Conclusion: The Road To Hell…
The future does not appear to be any different. A 2018 behavioral study on the Transparency on Online Plat-
form produced under the EU Consumer Program 2014–2020,164 noticed that ‘if there are problems, these 
do not concern transparency or informational asymmetries related to information searches or purchases’ 
rather, ‘a generalized characterization of many online uses is that they rely on blind trust.’165 This stems 
from consumers’ expectation that legislators will intervene and protect them from any unlawful behavior, 
although such trust might be misplaced.166 
The study revealed that consumers are unaware and unlikely to understand the risks to which they are 
exposed due to unfair practices, misleading information or other ways in which traders might exploit 
them.167 Moreover, it emphasized that real life consumers (not the super-consumer envisioned by the CJEU 
case law and adopted by the EU legislators), even when informed about online manipulations, accept it as 
a ‘commercial reality.’168 It also drew attention to the fact that ‘it is important for regulators to understand 
that consumers are unlikely to spend significant amounts of time going through voluminous search results, 
even if they are made aware of search manipulations by online platforms.’169 Last, but not least, the study 
restated that ‘much individual decision making occurs subconsciously, passively and unreflectively rather 
than through active and conscious deliberation.’170 
Therefore, one of the study’s major findings is that ‘when people are unaware and unconcerned, the asym-
metry between platforms and consumers calls for regulatory attention.’171 Nevertheless, the proposed solu-
tion falls short. After proving that people ignore information, the authors of the study suggest providing 
consumers with even more data, this time regarding search results, contractual identity and user reviews or 
ratings.172 In other words, to alleviate the risk posed by the fact that consumers tend to ignore information, 
more information is being given to them to ignore, while traders can go on about their usual business. The 
proposals for amending consumer legislation do not address or solve the issues posed by innovative and 
sophisticated financial products either.173 It is safe to assume that the information paradigm and the self-
help type of consumer protection, as unfit as they appear, are here to stay.
The article revealed the inefficiency of protection by way of information and showed that instead of ade-
quate product regulation and effective consumer protection, legislators provide consumers with data or 
mandatory disclaimers, shifting the task of protection from the EU authorities, to the consumers themselves. 
In the aftermath of the financial crisis caused by unregulated and misconstrued innovative financial 
products and in the wake of digital financial revolution, the burden of protection has been placed on the 
consumers who now must be ‘responsible’. This concept entails that given the passivity of EU regulators in 
addressing digital and financial challenges the consumer must take a pro-active approach, become finan-
cially and digitally literate, evaluate all the risks, make the right assessments, or suffer the consequences. 
However, there are risks that cannot be removed by simply informing consumers of their existence and such 
full delegation of responsibility would be extremely unfair. Controls on or bans of unsafe products and ser-
vices is expected174 and regulators’ intervention must go beyond educational campaigns and ads.  
 164 European Commission, Directorate-General for Justice and Consumers, ‘Behavioral Study on the Transparency of Online Platforms. 
Final Report, 2018 (Transparency Report), <https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/transparency_of_platforms-study-final-
report_en.pdf>, accessed 28 June 2018.
 165 Id 45, 57.
 166 Raymond, 146.
 167 Transparency Report, 45, 57.
 168 Id 48.
 169 Id 49. Further on the report states that ‘using decision short-cuts is part of normal human cognition. Decision short-cuts do not 
distort thinking; they reflect thinking. However, mandating the order of search results by price or some other criterion that is 
considered to be in the average consumer’s best interest, might disadvantage some consumers. In addition, implementing strict 
regulation on the way in which search results are presented to consumers, risks constraining innovation in the sector.’
 170 Id 57.
 171 Id 45–46.
 172 Id 46–47.
 173 European Commission, Press Release, ‘A New Deal for Consumers: Commission strengthens EU consumer rights and enforcement’, 
11 April 2018, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-18-3041_en.htm, accessed 28 October 2018.
 174 Howells, 365–367. Irina Domurath, ‘A Map of Responsible Lending and Responsible Borrowing in the EU and Suggestions for a 
Stronger Legal Framework to Prevent Over-Indebtedness of European Consumers’ in Micklitz and Domurath, 167.
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While the desire of the EU to preserve innovation on the (digital) internal market is legitimate, the treaty 
promise of high level of consumer protection in the digital age should not be turned into an empty slogan 
and handled only with ‘increased transparency’ or by shifting all burdens on the consumer. On the con-
trary, given that consumers face increasing sophistication and complexity of financial (digital) products, the 
regulators should also increase the level and effectiveness of consumer protection measures by becoming 
pro-active themselves and resorting to a functional approach of regulatory measures or bans, where product 
regulation is needed. This way, by catching financial and digital innovation within legal requirements and 
regulatory safeguards, the EU would provide adequate, efficient and harmonized protection to its consum-
ers without hindering the functioning of the market. 
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